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Author Notes:

Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall, Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 125 Nightingale Hall, Boston, MA 02115, USA e-mail: cd.wilson@neu.edu

Lisa Feldman Barrett and Lawrence W. Barsalou have joint senior authorship.

We thank A. Satpute and K. Lindquist for the meta-analysis codes indicating study methods/tasks.

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Subjects:

Research Funding:

Preparation of this manuscript was supported by an NIH Director’s Pioneer Award DPI OD003312 to Lisa Feldman Barrett at Northeastern University with a sub-contract to Lawrence Barsalou at Emory University.

Keywords:

  • emotion
  • situated cognition
  • affective neuroscience
  • affect
  • cognitive neuroscience

Situating emotional experience

Tools:

Journal Title:

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volume:

Volume 7

Publisher:

Type of Work:

Article | Final Publisher PDF

Abstract:

Psychological construction approaches to emotion suggest that emotional experience is situated and dynamic. Fear, for example, is typically studied in a physical danger context (e.g., threatening snake), but in the real world, it often occurs in social contexts, especially those involving social evaluation (e.g., public speaking). Understanding situated emotional experience is critical because adaptive responding is guided by situational context (e.g., inferring the intention of another in a social evaluation situation vs. monitoring the environment in a physical danger situation). In an fMRI study, we assessed situated emotional experience using a newly developed paradigm in which participants vividly imagine different scenarios from a first-person perspective, in this case scenarios involving either social evaluation or physical danger. We hypothesized that distributed neural patterns would underlie immersion in social evaluation and physical danger situations, with shared activity patterns across both situations in multiple sensory modalities and in circuitry involved in integrating salient sensory information, and with unique activity patterns for each situation type in coordinated large-scale networks that reflect situated responding. More specifically, we predicted that networks underlying the social inference and mentalizing involved in responding to a social threat (in regions that make up the “default mode” network) would be reliably more active during social evaluation situations. In contrast, networks underlying the visuospatial attention and action planning involved in responding to a physical threat would be reliably more active during physical danger situations. The results supported these hypotheses. In line with emerging psychological construction approaches, the findings suggest that coordinated brain networks offer a systematic way to interpret the distributed patterns that underlie the diverse situational contexts characterizing emotional life.

Copyright information:

© 2013 Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett and Barsalou.

This is an Open Access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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