The theory that the hippocampus is critical for visual memory and relational cognition has been challenged by discovery of more spared hippocampal tissue than previously reported in H.M., previously unreported extra-hippocampal damage in developmental amnesiacs, and findings that the hippocampus is unnecessary for object-in-context memory in monkeys. These challenges highlight the need for causal tests of hippocampal function in nonhuman primate models. Here, we tested rhesus monkeys on a battery of cognitive tasks including transitive inference, temporal order memory, shape recall, source memory, and image recognition. Contrary to predictions, we observed no robust impairments in memory or relational cognition either within- or between-groups following hippocampal damage. These results caution against over-generalizing from human correlational studies or rodent experimental studies, compel a new generation of nonhuman primate studies, and indicate that we should reassess the relative contributions of the hippocampus proper compared to other regions in visual memory and relational cognition.

The prefrontal cortex is larger than would be predicted by body size or visual cortex volume in great apes compared with monkeys. Because prefrontal cortex is critical for working memory, we hypothesized that recognition memory tests would engage working memory in orangutans more robustly than in rhesus monkeys. In contrast to working memory, the familiarity response that results from repetition of an image is less cognitively taxing and has been associated with nonfrontal brain regions. Across three experiments, we observed a striking species difference in the control of behavior by these two types of memory. First, we found that recognition memory performance in orangutans was controlled by working memory under conditions in which this memory system plays little role in rhesus monkeys. Second, we found that unlike the case in monkeys, familiarity was not involved in recognition memory performance in orangutans, shown by differences with monkeys across three different measures. Memory in orangutans was not improved by use of novel images, was always impaired by a concurrent cognitive load, and orangutans did not accurately identify images seen minutes ago. These results are surprising and puzzling, but do support the view that prefrontal expansion in great apes favored working memory. At least in orangutans, increased dependence on working memory may come at a cost in terms of the availability of familiarity.

Monkeys with selective damage to the hippocampus are often unimpaired in matching-to-sample tests but are reportedly impaired in visual paired comparison. While both tests assess recognition of previously seen images, delayed matching-to-sample may engage active memory maintenance whereas visual paired comparison may not. Passive memory tests that are not rewarded with food and that do not require extensive training may provide more sensitive measures of hippocampal function. To test this hypothesis, we assessed memory in monkeys with hippocampal damage and matched controls by providing them the opportunity to repeatedly view small sets of videos. Monkeys pressed a button to play each video. The same 10 videos were used for six consecutive days, after which 10 new videos were introduced in each of seven cycles of testing. Our measure of memory was the extent to which monkeys habituated with repeated presentations, watching fewer videos per session over time. Monkeys with hippocampal lesions habituated more slowly than did control monkeys, indicating poorer memory for previous viewings. Both groups dishabituated each time new videos were introduced. These results, like those from preferential viewing, suggest that the hippocampus may be especially important for memory of incidentally encoded events.

Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or “gamble” more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition

Adaptive decision making in humans depends on feedback between monitoring, which assesses mental states, and control, by which cognitive processes are modified. We investigated the extent to which monitoring and control interact iteratively in monkeys. Monkeys classified images as birds, fish, flowers, or people. At the beginning of each trial, to-be-classified images were not visible. Monkeys touched the image area to incrementally brighten the image, referred to as the brighten response. The amount by which brightness increased with each brighten response was unpredictable, and the monkeys could choose to classify the images at any time during a trial. We hypothesized that if monkeys monitored the status of their classification decision then they would seek information depending on the amount of information available. In Experiment 1, monkeys rarely used the brighten response when images were bright initially, and they used the brighten response more when earlier uses in a given trial yielded smaller amounts of information. In Experiment 2, monkeys made more brighten responses when the presented image did not belong in any of the trained categories, suggesting monkeys were sensitive to the fact that they could not reach a classification decision despite the image brightening. In Experiment 3, we found that the probability that monkeys used the brighten response correlated with their ability to correctly classify when the brighten response was not available. These findings add to the literature documenting the metacognitive skills of nonhuman primates by demonstrating an iterative feedback loop between cognitive monitoring and cognitive control that allows for adaptive information-seeking behavior.

Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014, pp. 115-131) critique recent "low-level" associative process models of nonhuman metacognition. We agree with many aspects of their critique. However, the alternative account they offer may not help specify the mechanisms of metacognition. We propose a middle-ground approach, based on the methods of comparative psychophysics, by which metacognition is treated as a discrimination problem.

Human working memory is a capacity- and duration-limited system in which retention and manipulation of information is subject to metacognitive monitoring and control. At least some nonhuman animals appear to also monitor and control the contents of working memory, but only relatively simple cases where animals monitor or control the presence or absence of single memories have been studied. Here we combine a comparatively complex order memory task with methodology that assesses the capacity to introspect about memory. Monkeys observed sequential presentations of five images, and at test, reported which of two images from the list had appeared first during study. Concurrently, they chose to complete or avoid these tests on a trial-by-trial basis. Monkeys “knew when they knew” the correct response. They were less accurate discriminating images that had appeared close in time to one another during study and were more likely to avoid these difficult tests than they were to avoid easier tests. These results indicate that monkeys can metacognitively monitor relatively complex properties of the contents of working memory, including the quality of representations of temporal relations among images.

Animals housed in naturalistic social groups with access to automated cognitive testing vary in whether and how much they participate in cognitive testing. Understanding how demographic, seasonal, and social factors relate to participation is essential to evaluating the usefulness of these systems for studying cognition and in assessing the data produced. We evaluated how sex, age, reproductive experience, seasonality, and rank related to patterns of participation in a naturalistic group of rhesus monkeys over a 4-year period. Females interacted with the touchscreen systems more than males and were more likely to complete initial training. Age was positively correlated with touchscreen activity through adolescence in females, at which point seasonality and reproductive experience were stronger associates of participation. While monkeys in different rank categories did not differ in how much they interacted with the touchscreen systems, monkeys of different ranks tended not to work at the same times, perhaps reflecting avoidance of high ranking animals by those of lower rank. Automated cognitive testing systems for naturalistic social groups of rhesus monkeys can yield quality cognitive data from individuals of all ages and ranks, but participation biases may make it difficult to study sex differences or seasonal variation in cognition.

Working memory is a system by which a limited amount of information can be kept available for processing after the cessation of sensory input. Because working memory resources are limited, it is adaptive to focus processing on the most relevant information. We used a retro-cue paradigm to determine the extent to which monkey working memory possesses control mechanisms that focus processing on the most relevant representations. Monkeys saw a sample array of images, and shortly after the array disappeared, they were visually cued to a location that had been occupied by one of the sample images. The cue indicated which image should be remembered for the upcoming recognition test. By determining whether the monkeys were more accurate and quicker to respond to cued images compared to un-cued images, we tested the hypothesis that monkey working memory focuses processing on relevant information. We found a memory benefit for the cued image in terms of accuracy and retrieval speed with a memory load of two images. With a memory load of three images, we found a benefit in retrieval speed but only after shortening the onset latency of the retro-cue. Our results demonstrate previously unknown flexibility in the cognitive control of memory in monkeys, suggesting that control mechanisms in working memory likely evolved in a common ancestor of humans and monkeys more than 32 million years ago. Future work should be aimed at understanding the interaction between memory load and the ability to control memory resources, and the role of working memory control in generating differences in cognitive capacity among primates.