Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or “gamble” more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition

Human working memory is a capacity- and duration-limited system in which retention and manipulation of information is subject to metacognitive monitoring and control. At least some nonhuman animals appear to also monitor and control the contents of working memory, but only relatively simple cases where animals monitor or control the presence or absence of single memories have been studied. Here we combine a comparatively complex order memory task with methodology that assesses the capacity to introspect about memory. Monkeys observed sequential presentations of five images, and at test, reported which of two images from the list had appeared first during study. Concurrently, they chose to complete or avoid these tests on a trial-by-trial basis. Monkeys “knew when they knew” the correct response. They were less accurate discriminating images that had appeared close in time to one another during study and were more likely to avoid these difficult tests than they were to avoid easier tests. These results indicate that monkeys can metacognitively monitor relatively complex properties of the contents of working memory, including the quality of representations of temporal relations among images.

Animals housed in naturalistic social groups with access to automated cognitive testing vary in whether and how much they participate in cognitive testing. Understanding how demographic, seasonal, and social factors relate to participation is essential to evaluating the usefulness of these systems for studying cognition and in assessing the data produced. We evaluated how sex, age, reproductive experience, seasonality, and rank related to patterns of participation in a naturalistic group of rhesus monkeys over a 4-year period. Females interacted with the touchscreen systems more than males and were more likely to complete initial training. Age was positively correlated with touchscreen activity through adolescence in females, at which point seasonality and reproductive experience were stronger associates of participation. While monkeys in different rank categories did not differ in how much they interacted with the touchscreen systems, monkeys of different ranks tended not to work at the same times, perhaps reflecting avoidance of high ranking animals by those of lower rank. Automated cognitive testing systems for naturalistic social groups of rhesus monkeys can yield quality cognitive data from individuals of all ages and ranks, but participation biases may make it difficult to study sex differences or seasonal variation in cognition.

Working memory is a system by which a limited amount of information can be kept available for processing after the cessation of sensory input. Because working memory resources are limited, it is adaptive to focus processing on the most relevant information. We used a retro-cue paradigm to determine the extent to which monkey working memory possesses control mechanisms that focus processing on the most relevant representations. Monkeys saw a sample array of images, and shortly after the array disappeared, they were visually cued to a location that had been occupied by one of the sample images. The cue indicated which image should be remembered for the upcoming recognition test. By determining whether the monkeys were more accurate and quicker to respond to cued images compared to un-cued images, we tested the hypothesis that monkey working memory focuses processing on relevant information. We found a memory benefit for the cued image in terms of accuracy and retrieval speed with a memory load of two images. With a memory load of three images, we found a benefit in retrieval speed but only after shortening the onset latency of the retro-cue. Our results demonstrate previously unknown flexibility in the cognitive control of memory in monkeys, suggesting that control mechanisms in working memory likely evolved in a common ancestor of humans and monkeys more than 32 million years ago. Future work should be aimed at understanding the interaction between memory load and the ability to control memory resources, and the role of working memory control in generating differences in cognitive capacity among primates.

© 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Evidence that the hippocampus is critical for spatial memory in nonnavigational tests is mixed. A recent study reported that temporary hippocampal inactivation impaired spatial memory in the nonnavigational Hamilton Search Task in monkeys. However, several studies have documented no impairment on other nonnavigational spatial memory tests following permanent hippocampal lesions. It was hypothesized that transient, but not permanent, hippocampal disruption produces deficits because monkeys undergoing transient inactivation continue to try to use a hippocampal-dependent strategy, whereas monkeys with permanent lesions use a nonhippocampal-dependent strategy. We evaluated this hypothesis by testing five rhesus monkeys with hippocampal lesions and five controls on a computerized analogue of the Hamilton Search Task. On each trial, monkeys saw an array of squares on a touchscreen, each of which “hid” one reward. Retrieving a reward depleted that location and monkeys continued selecting squares until they found all rewards. The optimal strategy is to remember chosen locations and choose each square once. Unlike the inactivation study, monkeys with hippocampal damage were as accurate as controls regardless of retention interval. Critically, we found no evidence that the groups used different strategies, as measured by learning rates, spatial search biases, perseverative win-stay errors, or inter-choice distance. This discrepancy between the effect of inactivations and lesions may result from off-target effects of inactivations or as-yet-unidentified differences between the physical and computerized tasks. Combined with previous evidence that hippocampal damage impairs navigational memory in monkeys, this evidence constrains the role of the hippocampus in spatial memory as being critical for navigational tests that likely involve allocentric spatial memory but not nonnavigational tests that likely involve egocentric spatial memory.

© 2018 Elsevier Ltd Human working memory is greatly facilitated by linguistic representations—for example, by verbal rehearsal and by verbal recoding of novel stimuli. The absence of language in nonhumans raises questions about the extent to which nonhuman working memory includes similar mechanisms. There is strong evidence for rehearsal-like active maintenance in working memory when monkeys are tested with highly familiar stimuli, but not when tested with novel stimuli, suggesting that working memory depends on the existence of previously encoded representations. This difference in working memory for familiar and novel images may exist because, lacking language, monkeys cannot recode novel stimuli in a way that permits active maintenance in working memory. Alternatively, working memory for novel images may have been present, but behaviorally silent, in earlier studies. In tests with novel images, the high familiarity of to-be-remembered stimuli compared to never-before-seen distractors may be such a strong determinant of recognition performance that evidence of working memory is obscured. In the current study, we developed a technique for attenuating the utility of relative familiarity as a mnemonic signal in recognition tests with novel stimuli. In tests with novel images, we observed impairments of memory by concurrent cognitive load and delay interval that indicate actively maintained working memory. This flexibility in monkey working memory suggests that monkeys may recode unfamiliar stimuli to facilitate working memory and establishes new parallels between verbal human working memory and nonverbal nonhuman primate working memory.

© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature. Some nonhuman species demonstrate metamemory, the ability to monitor and control memory. Here, we identify memory signals that control metamemory judgments in rhesus monkeys by directly comparing performance in two metamemory paradigms while holding the availability of one memory signal constant and manipulating another. Monkeys performed a four-choice match-to-sample memory task. In Experiment 1, monkeys could decline memory tests on some trials for a small, guaranteed reward. In Experiment 2, monkeys could review the sample on some trials. In both experiments, monkeys improved accuracy by selectively declining tests or reviewing samples when memory was poor. To assess the degree to which different memory signals made independent contributions to the metamemory judgement, we made the decline-test or review-sample response available either prospectively, before the test, or concurrently with test stimuli. Prospective metamemory judgements are likely controlled by the current contents of working memory, whereas concurrent metamemory judgements may also be controlled by additional relative familiarity signals evoked by the sight of the test stimuli. In both paradigms, metacognitive responding enhanced accuracy more on concurrent than on prospective tests, suggesting additive contributions of working memory and stimulus-evoked familiarity. Consistent with the hypothesis that working memory and stimulus-evoked familiarity both control metamemory judgments when available, metacognitive choice latencies were longer in the concurrent condition, when both were available. Together, these data demonstrate that multiple memory signals can additively control metacognitive judgements in monkeys and provide a framework for mapping the interaction of explicit memory signals in primate memory.

We studied the memory representations that control execution of action sequences by training rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to touch sets of five images in a predetermined arbitrary order (simultaneous chaining). In Experiment 1, we found that this training resulted in mental representations of ordinal position rather than learning associative chains, replicating the work of others. We conducted novel analyses of performance on probe tests consisting of two images "derived" from the full five-image lists (i.e., test B, D from list A→B→C→D→E). We found a "first item effect" such that monkeys responded most quickly to images that occurred early in the list in which they had been learned, indicating that monkeys covertly execute known lists mentally until an image on the screen matches the one stored in memory. Monkeys also made an ordinal comparison of the two images presented at test based on long-term memory of positional information, resulting in a "symbolic distance effect." Experiment 2 indicated that ordinal representations were based on absolute, rather than on relative, positional information because subjects did not link two lists into one large list after linking training, unlike what occurs in transitive inference. We further examined the contents of working memory during list execution in Experiments 3 and 4 and found evidence for a prospective, rather than a retrospective, coding of position in the lists. These results indicate that serial expertise in simultaneous chaining results in robust absolute ordinal coding in long-term memory, with rapidly updating prospective coding of position in working memory during list execution.

Metacognition is the ability to monitor and control one’s cognition. Monitoring may involve either public cues or introspection of private cognitive states. We tested rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in a series of generalization tests to determine which type of cues control metacognition. In Experiment 1, monkeys learned a perceptual discrimination in which a “decline-test” response allowed them to avoid tests and receive a guaranteed small reward. Monkeys declined more difficult than easy tests. In Experiments 2-4, we evaluated whether monkeys generalized this metacognitive responding to new perceptual tests. Monkeys showed a trend toward generalization in Experiments 2 & 3, and reliable generalization in Experiment 4. In Experiments 5 & 6, we presented the decline-test response in a delayed matching-to-sample task. Memory tests differed from perceptual tests in that the appearance of the test display could not control metacognitive responding. In Experiment 6, monkeys made prospective metamemory judgments before seeing the tests. Generalization across perceptual tests with different visual properties and mixed generalization from perceptual to memory tests provide provisional evidence that domain-general, private cues controlled metacognition in some monkeys. We observed individual differences in generalization, suggesting that monkeys differ in use of public and private metacognitive cues.