The Structure of Power and the Pattern of Public Spending in a Fiscal Federalism

• Type of Material: Article
• Authors: Melvin D Ayogu, Emory University
• Language: English
• Date: 2010-07-01
• Publisher: World Bank Group
• Publication Version: Author Accepted Manuscript (After Peer Review)
• Copyright Statement: World Bank Group
• License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO License
• Final Published Version (URL): https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/217581468759355294/the-structure-of-power-and-the-pattern-of-public-spending-in-a-fiscal-federalism
• Title of Journal or Parent Work: Understanding Poverty
• Start Page: 28755
• Grant/Funding Information: This research was supported by a grant from the African Economic Research Consortium, and financial support from CID, and Rockefeller African Humanities Institute, Harvard University.
• Keywords: military government; resource allocations; political economy analysis; policy making; public expenditures; political office
• Research Categories: Economics, Finance; Military Studies

Abstract

Focusing on Nigeria, the most populous state in Africa, this article explores the impact of political office-holding in the allocation of infrastructure spending within 1974 and 1995, a period dominated by the military government. The results document that impact of the structure of power upon the pattern of public-sector spending and help to account for the striking regional disparities that characterize resource allocations in this nation. We hope thereby to contribute to a better understanding of the political economy of policy making in African nations.