Publication

Incentivizing cost-effective reductions in hospital readmission rates

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Last modified
  • 03/05/2025
Type of Material
Authors
    James C. Cox, Georgia State UniversityVjollca Sadiraj, Georgia State UniversityKurt E. Schnier, University of CaliforniaJohn Sweeney, Emory University
Language
  • English
Date
  • 2016-11-01
Publisher
  • Elsevier
Publication Version
Copyright Statement
  • © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Final Published Version (URL)
Title of Journal or Parent Work
ISSN
  • 0167-2681
Volume
  • 131
Issue
  • B
Start Page
  • 24
End Page
  • 35
Grant/Funding Information
  • The research was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Aging (grant number 1RC4AG039071-01).
Supplemental Material (URL)
Abstract
  • The recent regulatory changes enacted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have identified hospital readmission rates as a critical healthcare quality metric. This research focuses on the utilization of pay-for-performance (P4P) mechanisms to cost effectively reduce hospital readmission rates and meet the regulatory standards set by CMS. Using the experimental economics laboratory we find that both of the P4P mechanisms researched, bonus and bundled payments, cost-effectively meet the performance criteria set forth by CMS. The bundled payment mechanism generates the largest reduction in patient length of stay (LOS) without altering the probability of readmission. Combined these results indicate that utilizing P4P mechanisms incentivizes cost effective reductions in hospital readmission rates.
Author Notes
Keywords
Research Categories
  • Health Sciences, Medicine and Surgery
  • Economics, General

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