Electoral systems and corruption

• Type of Material: Article
• Authors: Julie K. Faller, Harvard University; Adam N. Glynn, Harvard University; Nahomi Ichino, Emory University
• Language: English
• Date: 2013
• Publisher: PennState
• Publication Version: Author Accepted Manuscript (After Peer Review)
• Copyright Statement: 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
• License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
• Final Published Version (URL): https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=ff89a9080a75d6b977b375600db36b11e89f9a6f
• Title of Journal or Parent Work: CiteSeerX
• Keywords: corruption; electoral system; proportional representation; election
• Research Categories: Political Science, General

Abstract

What is the effect of electoral systems on corruption? Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) proposed that plurality electoral systems should lead to lower corruption compared to proportional representation (PR) systems because the former creates a direct link between voters and politicians whom voters can hold accountable for corruption. The empirical question remains unresolved, however, in part due to the endogeneity of the electoral institutions and difficulties in measuring corruption. Using nonparametric methods and new data to reduce sensitivity to these problems, we find no evidence for this hypothesis. Instead, we find some evidence in the opposite direction, that PR leads to less corruption.