Metacognition as discrimination: Commentary on Smith et al. (2014)

• Type of Material: Article
• Authors: Benjamin Basile, Emory University; Robert Hampton, Emory University
• Language: English
• Date: 2014-01-01
• Publisher: American Psychological Association
• Publication Version: Author Accepted Manuscript (After Peer Review)
• Copyright Statement: © 2014 American Psychological Association.
• Final Published Version (URL): http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034412
• Title of Journal or Parent Work: Journal of Comparative Psychology
• ISSN: 0735-7036
• Volume: 128
• Issue: 2
• Start Page: 135
• End Page: 137
• Grant/Funding Information: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation (grant 0745573), the National Center for Research Resources P51RR000165, the Office of Research Infrastructure Programs / OD P51OD011132, the Center for Behavioral Neuroscience under the Science and Technology Center Program of the National Science Foundation (under agreement IBN-9876754), and the National Institute of Mental Health (grant R01M H082819).
• Keywords: Animals; Uncertainty; Cognition; Learning; Psychology, Comparative
• Research Categories: Psychology, Cognitive

Abstract

Smith, Couchman, and Beran (2014, pp. 115-131) critique recent "low-level" associative process models of nonhuman metacognition. We agree with many aspects of their critique. However, the alternative account they offer may not help specify the mechanisms of metacognition. We propose a middle-ground approach, based on the methods of comparative psychophysics, by which metacognition is treated as a discrimination problem.