Oversight of Pathogen Research Must Be Carefully Calibrated and Clearly Defined

• Type of Material: Article
• Authors: Anice Lowen, Emory University; Arturo Casadevall, Johns Hopkins University; James C. Alwine, University of Pennsylvania; Lynn W. Enquist, Princeton University; Felicia D. Goodrum, University of Arizona, Tucson; Michael J. Imperiale, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Seema Lakdawala, Emory University
• Language: English
• Date: 2023-02-22
• Publisher: American Society for Microbiology
• Publication Version: Final Published Version
• Copyright Statement: © 2023 Lowen et al.
• License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
• Final Published Version (URL): https://doi.org/10.1128/mbio.00323-23
• Title of Journal or Parent Work: mBio
• Volume: 14
• Issue: 2
• Start Page: e00323
• End Page: 23
• Grant/Funding Information: No funding was used to support this editorial, but we wish to disclose funding received by authors from the National Institutes of Health and FluLab.
• Keywords: Dual Use Research of Concern; Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight; National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity; United States Government
• Research Categories: Health Sciences, Public Health; Biology, Microbiology

Abstract

By providing consultation to the United States Government (USG) on matters of biosecurity, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) plays a critical role in ensuring the safety of biomedical research in the United States. In February 2022, the NSABB was tasked with evaluating and providing recommendations on 2 current frameworks for USG oversight of research on pathogens of high consequence: Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) (1) and Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) (2). In response to this USG request, on January 27, 2023, the Board voted to approve 13 recommendations with minor modifications (3). If adopted, these recommendations will vastly change federal oversight of USG funded research on pathogens. Here, we restate the recommendations of the Board and give our response to each, with the goals of promoting modification of some aspects and of providing a resource to USG entities charged with implementing new policies that follow from the recommendations. We provide these responses out of concern for the potential consequences of excessive oversight: policy that unduly restricts microbiology regardless of associated risk will limit our preparedness for and ability to respond to public health threats, constrain efforts to control infectious diseases of all kinds, diminish our international engagement in these critical global issues and damage US economic competitiveness.